Incentive compensation

Income from an asset, XX, depends on manager decision AA and random factor ss, so X=f(A,s)X = f(A,s). Assume that managers are motivated by personal income I(X)I(X), such that the action taken A(I)=argmaxAEs(U(I(f(A,s)))A(I) = \arg\max_A{E_s(U(I(f(A,s)))} where UU is the manager's utility function and II is the incentive-compensation scheme.

The problem in incentive compensation (principle-agent theory) is that of finding argmaxIEs(f(A(I),s)I(X))\arg\max_I{E_s(f(A(I),s)-I(X))}, the incentive compensation scheme under which payoff to the owners is maximized. The inputs considered are the utility (including risk adversity) of the manager, UU, and the relationship of effort to outcome, ff.

By designing II, you want to maximize the incentive (the responsiveness of compensation to managerial effort) while minimizing the actual payoff, all while sharing risk so that the manager is not crippled by the risk involved.

Net-net, it seems to suggest that we don't want managers that are too rich, since the manager needs to have a significant proportion of his wealth vested in the company (to align risk interests and prevent moral hazard) at the same time the owners are trying not to pay him too much, and hence limit his ownership of the company. In fact, it seems to me that an equitable arrangement always results in the manager's percentage ownership of the company growing with time, an effect only partially offset by the growth in asset value as a whole. After all, what good reason can a manager give for not wanting to own more of the company they have control of?

The possibility of separating ownership from management is made possible by knowledge of responsiveness of managerial effort to reward (motivation, A(I)A(I)) and the responsiveness of asset income to managerial effort (ff). This knowledge cannot be guaranteed to always be of a form that makes the separation possible.

Learning to consume -- Brooks Brothers

Bought Brooks Brothers shirts for the first time today. Very curious pricing structure -- 1 shirt for $80, 3 shirts for $200, $60 off for going above $300.

The marginal prices of the 6 shirts I got were then $80, $80, $40, $80, $20, $40, making for an average price of $56.

2 comments
AcidFlask

Good job :) I bought two polo shirts there during the Labor Day sale. $23.50 each.

Chiao

So cheap! >_

hedonic treadmill avoidance

There's something awful about thinking that personal capabilities are strongly ordered - that for every two people with different capabilities, one of the two can do everything that the other can. This feeling is behind the aversion to taking money too seriously, because money is definitely strongly ordered. If money were everything, I'd either be better or worse than you, with no other possibility.

Thank god money isn't everything then. More accurately, thank god prices do not completely represent my desire for things. If everyone had the same desires and productive abilities, then prices would indeed represent desires, but because of the different desires (demands) and productivities (supplies), there is much to gain from exchanging goods I produce with other people.

To the extent that people conform in their desire for scarce items, however, prices are inevitably accurate measures of personal demand, and it's an endless rat race. To the extent to which prices of things are aligned with the degree what I want them, there is only one way to become happier - to make more money.

1 comment
r

very recently, i was told by my boss, in these exact words, "i want to buy your time spent doing X but not your time spent doing Y". so that provided me with a conclusive answer to the question i ask myself every morning during my 5-minutes negotiating with myself to get out of bed - "why go to work today?" why, the answer is, obviously, "so i can sell my time!"